Only a few other teachers will have the opportunity or be interested in offering a full course on machine ethics. But given the breath of themes we touched upon, others may find one or two of the topics from this seminar useful for exposing their students to particular aspects of ethics.
In our earlier meetings, we surveyed ethical and societal challenges posed by the development of service robots and the military use of weapons-carrying robots. The basic point I hoped students would grasp is that the increasing autonomy of computers and robots meant that engineers and designers could not always predict what these systems would do when the robots encountered new situations with new inputs. Some basic evaluation of moral considerations by the robots would be necessary to ensure that their actions did not cause harm to humans or other entities worthy of moral consideration. In other words, implementing moral decision making in robots is a practical ethical challenge.
However, I did poll students at the end of the first meeting as to whether they believed robots would ever be able to make sophisticated moral decisions. They were roughly divided on whether this was possible. I polled them again on this question at the end of our last meeting.
During our first class, the students generally agreed that implementing moral decision making faculties within robots was an important task, although they differed on whether this was possible, and if possible, whether the robots would be doing anything more than executing instructions built into their program by engineers. A central question was whether deterministic machines could make moral decisions? This led directly into a discussion of free will and determinism. I could generally rely on one of the computer science majors raising the question of whether decisions made by humans were any freer than those that would eventually be made by thinking machines. Thus an underlying tension in the course was set up very early in our discussions. In what ways do we humans truly differ from the artificial entities we will create? Some of the students were aware of predictions that robots will equal and then exceed human intelligence within the next few decades. This transition is often referred to as the Singularity. But in order to keep the Singularity from being a premise that would color all of our reflections, I tried to ground the discussion more in the technologies we have today, and what we can anticipate over the next decade. What exists between here and the more intelligent robots being predicted? Might some of the societal, ethical, and technological challenges encountered along the way arrest the development of robots with higher order cognitive faculties?
In considering how to implement moral decision making within robots two approaches come to mind:
1. Top-down: methods for implementing a set of rules (The Ten Commandments or Asimov's Laws for Robots) or a top-down theory (utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative) into a computational system.
2. Bottom-up: approaches inspired by either evolution or moral development that would facilitate a robot acquiring sensitivity to moral considerations.
Three of the sessions were spent on top-down and bottom-up approaches. These afforded the opportunity to teach the basics of deontological and consequential theories, evolutionary psychology, and moral education. Beyond introducing these subjects, our discussion probed whether any of these theories or approaches is computationally tractable. Could they be implemented in a robot?
Students who were unfamiliar with fields of research outside their major were at best getting an educated dilettante's introduction. Whenever a new subject came up, we broke for a five to ten minute mini-lecture. A student who had majored in the relevant field would attempt to teach her colleagues about the prisoner's dilemma, rule utilitarianism, genetic algorithms, or Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development. After the student finished, I would underscore the key points. Sometimes the student's explanations were rather poor, so I needed to be prepared with clear and quick summaries of key subject matter. Another trick was to anticipate the themes for the coming week, and to spend the last few minutes of the class with a mini-lecture that outlined the fields which would be touched upon in our next meeting.
I had the luxury of motivated, expressive students. But if that is absent, this course could also be taught through lectures. Better yet would be lectures together with a once a week seminar.
For a mid-semester assignment, students were asked to pick a top-down ethical theory and discuss whether that theory could be implemented in a robot. The first year I taught the course, about a third of the students elected to write on implementing rule utilitarianism in a robot. Surprisingly, in the second year five students explored whether a robot might be capable of evaluating choices and actions using Kant's categorical imperative.
The strengths and weaknesses of either a top-down or bottom-up approach soon became apparent to all the members of the class, and we then turned to a hybrid approach that might combine the two. Interestingly, virtue ethics can be looked at as a hybrid, given that the virtues can be described as top-down aspects of character, but they are also habits of mind and body learned through experience. Some theorists have proposed that the connectionist learning by a neural network has similarities to the kind of learning Aristotle proposes in the Nicomachean Ethics.
In our meetings we also touched upon philosophy of computing, engineering ethics, and whether computers should be allowed to make moral decisions. I assigned Caroline Whitbeck's 1995 essay on "Teaching Ethics to Scientists and Engineers: Moral Agents and Moral Problems" to the students. I believed it would be helpful for them to appreciate the differences in how engineers would approach moral problems from the way they are discussed by moral philosophers or in political debates.
Up to this point our classes had addressed the prospect of robots making appropriate ethical choices within limited contexts. However, there was a constant pressure to consider whether more advanced systems could be full artificial moral agents. A session was dedicated to criteria for attributing moral agency, and whether a mindless system can be a moral agent. This opened up into a broader discussion of what machines could understand, emotional intelligence, embodied cognition, and social skills. What, in addition to being able to reason about moral challenges, would an artificial agent need in order to function as a moral agent? Could we imagine a robot being a moral agent if it lacked emotions of its own, consciousness, an understanding of the semantic content of symbols, free will, or empathy, or if it was not embodied in a world with other agents? Certainly even a disembodied computer might make appropriate ethical choices within specific contexts without all these additional attributes or cognitive skills. But full moral agency might depend upon many capabilities in addition to moral reasoning, capabilities that are often taken for granted when discussing humans.
Those without a background in computer science were surprised to learn that there are active research programs in affective computing, machine consciousness, embodied cognition, social robotics, and a theory of mind for robots. However, this does not mean it will be easy to reproduce all these human-like abilities within computational systems. Indeed, robots may be capable of acquiring certain functional skills in ways that would be very different from the manner in which humans perform the same tasks. For example, sonar and other sensors have been more useful in helping robots navigate around rooms and buildings than visual perception.
In some respects computers have the potential to be better moral decision makers than human. Their rationality is less bounded, and therefore they may be able to evaluate a greater array of responses to a difficult challenge than a human would consider. In turn they might come up with a better solution to a complex situation. Presumably, computers will not be subject to jealousy, sexual pressures, or emotional hijackings, unless simulated emotions are programmed into them. That is, computers are more likely to emulate a stoic ideal. It has also be argued by Ronald Arkin that a robot soldier is likely to be more ethical than a human soldier because the robot can be relied upon to obey the laws of warfare and rules of engagement.
Considerations as to whether robots could be full moral agents opened the floodgates to a host of futuristic issues. Who should be held accountable when a robot commits a harmful act? Could a robot be held accountable for its own action? Does punishing a robot for a violation make any sense? Should an advanced robot be given rights? If robots will eventually be smarter than humans, then how can we ensure that such advanced systems will be friendly to humans and human concerns? If we cannot rely on future robots being friendly, should we relinquish research on advanced forms of artificial intelligence?
A great deal of intellectual excitement is generated by the breadth of serious philosophical and practical ethical questions that converge on the field of machine ethics. While the explicit topic is implementing moral decision making in robots, the implicit theme is human decision making and ethics. How do we make moral decisions? Reflecting on building artificial moral agents forces one to approach human moral decision making in a particularly comprehensive manner.
At the end of the last meeting I again asked the students whether they believed we would develop robots capable of making sophisticated moral decision. Most of the students believe we would, although a significant minority of the students still felt we were unlikely to be able to build robots with full human-like cognitive capabilities.
NOTE
The bibliography for this seminar is available upon request. The original seminars relied on primary source materials, as there was no one text at the time that surveyed the breadth of subjects we touched upon. 
